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The Bank of England did not publish figures for bankers' deposits until
1967. The first economist to use that information was Goodhart (1972).
This study builds on and reexamines the work of Goodhart, whose
conclusions conflict with the conventional wisdom about the Bank and
the gold standard.
Section 4.1 reviews some of Goodhart's results, section 4.2 examines
the long-run operations of the Bank, section 4.3 analyzes short-run
behavior, and the final section 4.4 presents the conclusions. An appendix
provides spectral estimates of key variables examined in this study.
4.1 Goodhart's Results
Goodhart (1972) analyzed the operations of the Bank of England and
British commercial banks and their roles in the functioning of the gold
standardfrom 1891 to 1914. His conclusions about the role ofthe Bankin
the operation of the gold standard challenge the conventional wisdom.
The strongest link in the causal chain ofthe classical analysis of the
working ofthe gold standard mechanism is generally considered to be
that connecting changes in the reserve base of the commercial banks
with fluctuations in the (gold) reserve, or liquidity, position of the
central bank. Yet in this study ofthe working ofthe system in the UK
this is the link which shatters.
. . . there is no simple direct relationship between the variations in
the levels of bankers' balances at the Bank and in the level of the
reserve in the Bank. (Goodhart 1972, p. 209)
This conclusion rests primarilyontwo regressions. Inthefirst, monthly
data on bankers' balances at the head office ofthe Bank of England are
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regressed against time, reserves in the Banking Department, and sea-
sonal factors. There is no link between bankers' balances and reserves.
Bankers' balances =7913.5 + 37.74 time
(967.4) (1.97)
- 1.29 reserves + seasonals.
(34.53)
With seasonals R2 =0.64, D.W. =1.07.
Without seasonals R
2 =0.56.
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
The second equation is in logs and adds railway freight receipts as a
proxy for nominal income.
Log bankers' balances =4.843 + 0.0006 time
(1.142) (0.0003)
+ 0.707 log freight receipts
(0.167)
+ 0.092 log reserves.
(0.40)
With Seasonals R2 =0.679, D.W. =0.96.
Without seasonals R
2 = 0.579.
Now a positiverelationbetweenbankers' balances andreservesemerges,
but the estimated response to income is several times larger than the
response to reserves.
Goodhart also estimates two other relationships that are relevant for
the operations ofthe BankofEngland. One attempts to explain the ratio
ofreserves in the Banking Department to total liabilities ofthat depart-
ment----otherwise known as the proportion.
Log proportion =7.39 + 0.0006 time
(0.78) (0.0002)
- 0.79 log freight receipts
(0.11)
+ 0.53 log reserves + seasonals.
(0.03)
With seasonals R2 =0.765, D.W. = 0.90.
Without seasonals R
2 =0.584.
The standard errors are in parentheses. Goodhart (1972, p. 206) inter-
pretsthis result as follows: "Itsuggests that the Bankmust have regularly
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caused by changes in the level ofdomestic activity by varying its holdings
of other assets, independently of the level of gold reserves."
The final relationship attempts to explain Bank rate in terms of trend
and the liquidity position ofthe BankofEngland, first using the propor-
tion and then the reserves as a measure of liquidity:
Bank rate = 4.48 + 0.0012 time
(0.89) (0.0004)
- 1.09 log proportion
(0.22)
+ 0.746 Bank rate (t - 1) + seasonals.
(0.037)
With seasonals "R 2 = 0.795.




= 2.49 + 0.0021 time
(0.55) (0.0005)
- 0.714 log reserves
(0.165)
+ 0.756 Bank rate (t -1) + seasonals.
(0.038)
= 0.791.
Without seasonals "R 2 = 0.749.
Thenumbersin parenthesesare thestandarderrors. Theresultsshowthe
expected inverse relation between Bankrate and the liquidity positionof
the Banking Department.
The next two sections reexamine the operations of the Bank of En-
gland, employing as much as possible the data used by Goodhart.
2 The
first section concentrates on the long-run and the second looks at the
short-run behavior of the Bank.
4.2 Long-Run Operations
This section concentrates on long-run behavior by using annual aver-
ages ofmonthly data.
3 The next section, in order to emphasize short-run
operations, uses monthly changes.
Sayers (1976, p. 8) pointsoutthatthe governoroftheBankofEngland
had three primary objectives.
Hehad astatutorydutyto maintaintheconvertibilityofthe noteinto
gold coin; he had a political duty to look after the financial needs of
government; and he had a commercial duty to maintain an income for206 John Pippenger
the stockholders. Whenever possible, he was running all three horses
atonce, butiftherewas a conflict, heknewwhichhehadtoputfirst. He
would think of his primary duty as the maintenance of the gold stan-
dard.
Although a varietyofspecialsituationsprobablyinfluencedtheshort-run
operations of the Bank, the duties cited by Sayers, particularly the
statutory and commercial duties, appear to dominate long-run behavior
of the Bank.
4.2.1 Bankers' Deposits and Reserves
Goodhart's most challenging discovery is the weak relationship be-
tween reserves in the Banking Department and bankers' deposits at the
Bank of England. His results threaten a crucial link in the conventional
interpretation of the gold standard.
Consider a very simple model of Bank-portfolio behavior in which
desired reserves R depend on deposits and interest rates.
(1) R = <xii + <xzBD + <X3NBD + e,
where i is the market rate of interest (or vector of such rates), BD is
bankers' deposits, and NBD is nonbankers' deposits at the Bank.
4 Re-
writing equation (1) yields an expression describing bankers' deposits.
(1')
Itis hardlysurprising that Goodhartfinds no link betweenreserves and
bankers' deposits. Equation (1) implies that reserves are correlatedwith
theerrorterminhis regression. Inaddition, theinfluenceofinterestrates
and other deposits is ignored. The inclusion of time compounds the
problem because time tends to exclude any positive relation between
bankers' deposits and reserves generated by growth.
Goodhart'sattempttoregress bankers' deposits againsttime, reserves,
and a proxyfor income has even less discriminatory power. Considerthe
following simple linear model for the determination of reserves. The
demand for money depends on income and interest rates.
(2)
The supply ·of money by the banking system depends on notes N plus
bankers' deposits at the Bank and interest rates.
(3)
Add a simplified balance sheet for the combined Banking and Issue
departments of the Bank.
(4) BD+N=R+S,
where S is securities held by the Bank.207 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
Equations (2)-(4) imply the following solution for reserves.
(5) R = ko- 'Yo + !Ly + kz + 'Y3 i
'Yl 'Yl 'Yl
- S + 'Yl - 'Y2 BD.
'Yl
In this equation bankers' deposits are unrelated to reserves if 'Yl equals
'Y2. Thisresulthowever, ignoresthefact thatbanksarefree tochoosehow
they hold liquid reserves. For simplicity, suppose they hold notes and
deposits at the Bank in some fixed proportion.
(6) N ='Y4BD.
Equations (4) and (6) imply the following.
(7) BD = [111 + 'Y4)](R + S) .
Substituting equation (7) into (5) yields a solution for reserves that is
independent of bankers' deposits at the Bank of England.
(8)
_K( 1 + 'Y4 + 'Y2 - 'Yl) S,
1 + 'Y4
where K equals 1/['Yl + ('Yl - 'Y2)/(1 + 'Y4)]. Bankers' deposits are
unrelated to reserves in equation (8) because those deposits are deter-
mined primarily by the public's demand for money and the portfolio
decisions of commercial banks.
A more appropriate way to evaluate the link between reserves and
bankers' deposits is to estimate an equation like (1). Equation (1) how-
ever ignores the Bank's statutory duties and treats the Bank as though it
were only another commercial bank. In orderto capture the influence of
its role as a central bank, a proxy for income and a measure of for-
eign-relative-to-domestic interest rates are added to equation (1).
If Goodhart's argument that the Bank essentially accommodated the
demand for money is correct, then the coefficient for both variables
should be negative. Higher rates abroad should lead to a loss ofreserves
and higher income should increase the money stock leading to a rise in
bankers' deposits and anoutflowofnotesfrom theBankingDepartment.
If the Bank operated only as a commercial bank, the coefficients for
both these variables presumably would be zero. If however the Bank
actively protected convertibility by responding to potential gold flows,
then reserves in the Banking Department should increase as domestic
income expands and foreign yields rise relative to domestic rates.
The results from estimating such an equation using annual averages of
monthly data are as follows, where t-statistics are in parentheses.208 John Pippenger
R = -8847.75 + 0.52NBD + O.57BD
(1.90) (6.82) (2.29)
- 2661.76i + 9040.07r + 9.35Y.
(5.17) (2.96) (1.54)
R2 =0.87, D.W. = 1.73.
The domestic interest rate i is the yield on fortnightly loans, r is the
French market rate over i, and Y is railway freight receipts.
Including both bankers' deposits and a proxy for income is likely to
underestimate the influence of bankers' deposits because those deposits
are related· to income through the demand for money. The proxy for
income therefore is dropped and the equation reestimated. Since elimi-
nating income substantially reduces the D.W. statistics, the equation is
estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique.





2 = 0.82, D.W. = 1.77, p = 0.352.
The results do not support accommodation. The Bank held reserves
against both bankers' deposits and other liabilities. Indeed the Bank
seems to have been very conservative, holding up to eighty pounds in
reserves for each one hundred pounds of deposits. The results also
suggest that the Bank actively protected convertibility by increasing
reserves as foreign rates increased relative to domestic rates. Although
the coefficient on the proxy for income is not significant in the first
regression, it is positive and therefore tends to refute accommodation.
The Bank's concern for profit also emerges from these estimates. The
coefficient on domestic rates is negative andsignificant, which is what we
would expect from a bank concerned about paying dividends.
4.2.2 Proportion
The proportion P of reserves in the Banking Department to total
liabilities was the most common measure of the Bank's liquidity.
Goodhart's estimates based on monthly data reveal an inverse relation
between the proportion and his proxy for income, which he interprets as
supportfor an accommodative Bank. The analysis ofthe Bank's demand
for reserves however suggests that the proportion should reflect the
Bank'sconcernfor dividends andthe desire to protectconvertibility. The
proportion therefore should depend directly on foreign relative to
domestic yields and be related inversely to domestic interest rates. In209 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
order to test Goodhart's hypothesis, his proxy for income also is in-
cluded.
Estimating such a relationship yields the following result.
P = 0.318 - 0.052i + 0.193r + 0.0002Y.
(3.98) (5.29) (3.51) (3.38)
R
2 = 0.73, D.W. = 1.69.
The fit is good. All of the coefficients are significant at better than the 1
percent level and the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates that there is no
serial correlation in the residuals. The evidence does not support accom-
modation. The Bank systematically reduced liquidity in order to earn
income and protected convertibility by becoming increasingly conserva-
tive as domestic income increased orforeign rates rose relative to domes-
tic rates.
5
This result is particularly interesting because it provides insight into
how the Bank handled the conflict between its statutory and commercial
duties. For example, an upswing in business activity tended to make
earning assets more attractive as interest rates rose, but the increased
activity also posed a threat to convertibility. The Bank apparently re-
spondedto bothinfluences, raising the proportionin response to increas-
ing income and lowering it as interest rates rose. Such a policy ofcourse
would make it very difficult to identify a systematic pattern in Bank
behavior over the business cycle and may help explain Bloomfield's
inability to find evidence supporting the rules ofthe game in his seminal
work (1959).
4.2.3 Bank Rate
The conventional story in which the Bank raises the discount rate in
response to a loss of reserves is a disequilibrium process that is not
relevant for this section because in the long run the actual and desired
portfolio should be equal. Since the Bank ofEngland was only one bank
in the London money market and London was only part of the world
capital market, in the long run Bank rate should follow rather then
influence market rates. Bank rate therefore is assumed to depend pri-
marily on market rates. A proxy for income and a measure of foreign
relative to domestic rates were included to see if the Bank responded to
potential threats to convertibility. Since the (-statistic for income is less
thanone, it has beendropped. Thefinal result for Bankrate is as follows.
BR = - 0.443 + 0.882i + 1.000r.
(1.225) (18.73) (3.09)
R2 = 0.95, D.W. = 2.26.210 John Pippenger
The fit is verygood. Bothcoefficients are significant at the 1percentlevel
and there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals.
The results indicate that the Bank actively protected convertibility by
raising Bankrate basis pointfor basispointwith the rise in Frenchmarket
rates relative to domestic yields. The evidence also suggests that Bank
rate did not fully respond to domestic yields. This result however may
reflect the fact that i is the yield on fortnightly loans while Bank rate
tended to apply to longer maturities.
4.2.4 Summary
Although the results of this section indicate that the Bank was more
concerned about profit than is often recognized in the conventional story
about the gold standard, the evidence generally supports the conven-
tional wisdom. In the long runthe Bankwas very conservative, maintain-
ing up to eighty pounds sterling or more in liquid reserves for each
hundredpoundsin deposits. Such behaviorimpliesthattheBankdidplay
by the rules of the game and bought assets as reserves increased. Of
course, ifthemonetaryapproachis correct, this behaviorhadno long-run
effect except to alter the Bank's liquidity and earnings.
Theevidence also suggests thattheBankrespondedtoforeign financial
conditions and followed a mixed monetary policy over the course ofthe
business cycle. Reserves, the proportion, and Bank rate all rose as
French market rates rose relative to domestic rates. This movement
suggests that the Bank was sensitive to the threat to convertibility from
international capital flows. Although the commercial duties ofthe Bank
promoted a procyclical monetary policy, concern for convertibility
apparently led the Bank to increase the proportion as nominal income
expanded.
4.3 Short-Run Operations
Analysis oflong-run behavior ofthe Bankis relatively straightforward
because simultaneity is not a serious problem. In the shortrun, however,
the Bank'sportfolio decisions can affect bankers' deposits, interest rates,
and othervariables, and equationslike those estimated in the last section
may be biased in the short run.
Two-stage least squares can deal with simultaneity, but it does not
appear to be applicable here. The technique requires the use ofexplana-
toryvariablesin thefirst stage thatareindependentfrom theerrortermin
the secondstage. No suchvariables appearto be available. Oneofcourse
could use two-stage least squares anyway and pretend that the problem
was solved. The choice here however is to use OLS and accept the bias
due to simultaneity.
The variance of economic time series, including the ones used here,(11)
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tends to be dominated by long-run or low-frequency components. Since
we want to concentrate on short-run behavior, and differencing tends to
filter out long-run components ofthe variance in time series, the analysis
of this section uses monthly changes.
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4.3.1 Reserves
The results of the last section indicate that in the long run, desired
reserves R D depend on bankers' balances BD, nonbankers' deposits
NBD, market yields i, and foreign-relative-to-domestic interest rates r.
(9) R
D = ao + alBD + a2NBD - a3 i + a4 r + el,
where el is an appropriate error term. Equation (9) describes the Bank's
equilibrium or steady-state demand for reserves. This equation can be
converted to a short-run model by using a simple stock-adjustment
model.
(10) dRt = 'AI(RP- Rt- l ) + 'A2LlG + ez,
where LlG is the gold flow into (+) and out of (- ) the United Kingdom
and e2 reflects other shocks such as internal drains due to holidays.
The solution for reserves implied by equations (9) and (10) is given by
equation (11).
Rt = 'Alao + 'AlalBD + 'Ala2NBD - 'Ala3i
+ 'AI a4r + 'AzLlG + ('AI ele2) .
In estimating this equation in first differences, the seasonal components
in ez are captured with seasonal dummies.
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There are two majorpotential sources for simultaneous-equations bias
in this model. Considera situation in which the Bankhas excess reserves.
In order to move toward portfolio equilibrium, the Bankbuys securities.
The purchase ofsecurities raises bankers' deposits, reduces reserves, and
tends to lower interest rates. As a result, unless the monetary approach
holds even for monthly data, portfolio decisions by the Bank influence
bankers' deposits and inter¥st rates. The influence on interest rates
however is probably not as important as for bankers' deposits. Purchases
of securities almost certainly had an initial pound-for-pound impact on
bankers' balances, but the Bank ofEngland was only one ofmany banks
in the London money market and for periods as long as a month there
almost certainly was a strong link between the London and world capital
markets.
When equation (11) is estimated in first differences, there is significant
negative serial correlation in the residuals. The results reported in table
4.1 therefore are based on the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. The OLS
results (table 4.2) however are almost identical, as they are for the other'
two regressions reported in table 4.1.212 John Pippenger
Table 4.1 Short-Run Determinants of Reserves, Proportion, and Bank Rate
(with first-order autocorrelation correction)
Dependent Variables
Inde- ~R ~p ~BR
pendent Estimate Estimate Estimate
Variables (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Constant -28.25 -0.001 -0.008
(0.24) (0.59) (0.39)
~i -199.32 -0.007 0.609
(0.94) (1.68) (14.84)
~r -124.33 -0.015 0.317
(0.21) (1.12) (2.58)
~G 526.33 0.009 -0.026
(10.32) (7.82) (2.56)
Mol -1366.81 -0.038 -0.081
(2.57) (3.10) (0.72)
M02 3719.67 0.053 -0.036
(6.49) (4.05) (0.30)
Mo3 -878.30 -0.010 0.083
(1.44) (0.81) (0.68)
Mo4 -1981.79 -0.037 -0.058
(3.46) (2.96) (0.50)
Mo5 1191.53 0.030 -0.081
(2.07) (2.35) (0.70)
Mo6 1119.74 0.021 -0.008
(2.17) (1.82) (0.07)
Mo7 -183.78 -0.001 -0.027
(0.35) (0.08) (0.24)
Mo8 240.20 0.013 0.202
(0.45) (1.08) (1.85)
Although equation (11) does a good job of explaining changes in
reserves with an R
2 of 0.60, there is no evidence of a stock-adjustment
mechanism. The coefficients for i, r, BD and R t - 1 are all insignificant.
The explanatory power of the equation comes from the seasonal dum-
mies together with gold flows and nonbankers' deposits. The insignifi-
cance of bankers' deposits probably results from a tendency for a pur-
chase of securities to increase those deposits and reduce reserves.
4.3.2 Proportion
The long-run model for the proportion is also converted to the short
run by using a simple stock-adjustment model. The equilibrium-desired
proportion is described by equation (12) and stock adjustment by (13).
(12) pD=bo-b1i+b2r+b3Y+El.
(13) aPr = 'Yl[pf- Pr-l] + 'Y2LlG + E2·213 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
Table 4.1 (continued)
Dependent Variables
Inde- flR flP flBR
pendent Estimate Estimate Estimate
Variables (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Mo9 1793.96 0.027 0.210
(3.45) (2.33) (1.94)
Mo10 -1931.22 -0.016 0.056
(3.42) (1.21) (0.46)
Moll 109.68 0.011 -0.048
(0.19) (0.93) (0.42)










p -0.275 -0.220 -0.314
R2 0.60 0.44 0.61
h -0.61 -0.70 (D.W.) 2.06
SE 1602.51 0.037 0.331
Notes: fl first difference; R = Bank of England reserves; P = Bank of England
proportion; BR = Bankrate; i = marketyield onfortnightly loans; r = Frenchmarketrate
over market yield on fortnightly loans; G = gold flows into oroutofthe United Kingdom;
Mol-Moll = seasonal factors; BD = bankers' deposits; NBD = nonbankers' deposits; Y
= railway freight receipts (proxy for income).
Equation (14) is the solution for the observed proportion
(14) Pt = "I1 hO - 'Ylbl i + 'Ylb2'+ "I1b3Y
+ 'Y2ilG+ ("11 E + E2)'
The error terms here have the same interpretation as in the model for
reserves, and seasonal factors again are added.
The results from estimating equation (14) in first differences are re-
ported in table 4.1. They reveal a pattern similar to that for reserves.
Noneofthefactors explainingtheequilibriumbehavioroftheproportion
are significant. The coefficient for the lagged proportion is significant but
negative. Gold flows have the expected sign and are significant. Several
seasonal factors also are important.
Although short-run models for reserves and the proportion explain a
reasonable amount of the variance in those variables, the results do not
show any evidence of a portfolio adjustment mechanism. Even after six214 John Pippenger
Table 4.2 Short-Run Determinants of Reserves, Proportion, and Bank Rate
(without first-order autocorrelation correction)
Dependent Variables
Inde- aR ap aBR
pendent Estimate Estimate Estimate
Variables (t-statistic) (t-statistic) (t-statistic)
Constant - 81.94 -0.002 -0.006
(0.56) (0.75) (0.21)
ai -208.29 -0.008 0.557
(0.97) (1.91) (13.14)
ar -128.78 -0.015 0.285
(0.22) (1.20) (2.33)
aG 489.15 0.008 -0.033
(9.77) (7.77) (3.15)
Mol -864.48 -0.032 -0.042
(1.59) (2.56) (0.36)
Mo2 3537.34 0.047 -0.088
(6.18) (3.62) (0.72)
Mo3 -146.97 -0.001 0.079
(0.24) (0.10) (0.64)
Mo4 1758.14 -0.039 -0.054
(3.09) (3.10) (0.46)
Mo5 922.25 0.029 -0.123
(1.59) (2.25) (1.04)
Mo6 1200.92 0.026 -0.013
(2.33) (2.19) (0.12)
Mo7 59.66 0.002 -0.035
(0.11) (0.17) (0.32)
Mo8 214.27 0.012 0.180
(0.40) (1.06) (1.62)
Mo9 1829.56 0.030 0.213
(3.53) (2.58) (1.94)
Mo10 1867.23 -0.014 0.054
(3.32) (1.08) (0.43)













2 0.59 0.43 0.57
h -4.10 -3.63 (D.W.) 2.56
SE 1634.42 0.037 0.347
Notes: See table 4.1.215 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
lags areaddedfor therelevantexplanatoryvariablessuch as interestrates
and income, there is no evidence of stock adjustment.
The lack ofany evidence ofa stock-adjustmentmechanismprobablyis
due to three factors. The first is simultaneous-equations bais, which has
already beendiscussed. Thesecondis ourinabilitytocapturemanyofthe
short-run influences to which the Bank responded. For example, we can
observe changes in reserves, but not the source of those changes. The
Bank however had information about the source of reserve changes,
whether they were internal orexternal and, if external, whether the gold
came from France or South Africa.
The third, and perhaps most important, factor is the evolution of the
Bank's short-run operating procedures. The long-run objectives of the
Bank and its equilibrium portfolio probably did not change very much
from 1893 to 1913. The short-run operating procedures by which the
Bank attempted to reach its equilibrium portfolio however, were con-
tinually evolving (see Sayers 1976, pp. 28--60). In the 1890s the Bankhad
a great deal oftrouble making Bankrate effective. Itresorted to manipu-
lating gold points, borrowing from private depositors, and engaging in
transactions that were very close to open-market operations. After 1907
it relied primarily on Bank rate and rarely used these other techniques.
As a result of the evolving short-run operating procedures, the adjust-
ment mechanism changed over time, making it difficult to identify a
significant distributed lag for the long-run determinants of the portfolio
such as deposits and interest rates.
4.3.3 Bank Rate
Even though they have not been successful, stock-adjustment models
for reserves and the proportion can be justified on the grounds that
portfolio adjustments are costly. This argument however seems much
weakerfor Bankrate andso a different approachis usedhere. Asimplied
by the long-run results, Bankrate depends on domesticinterestrates and
foreign-relative-to-domestic yields. For the short run, two other factors
are added. It is assumed that the Bankraises Bankrate when the desired
proportion exceeds the actual proportion and when the domestic gold
stock declines.
(15) BRt = do + d1it + d2rt + d3[pf- Pt - 1]
- d41i.Gt + Ut ·
Substituting equation (12) into (15) yields the solution for Bank rate.
(15') BRt = (do + d3bo) + (d1- d3b1)i + (d2 + d3b2)r
- d3Pr-l + d3b3Y - d41i.Gt
+ (d3 El + Ut)·216 John Pippenger
Asin theearliermodels, seasonaldummies areincludedandthe equation
is estimated in first differences.
Ifone accepts an integratedworld capital market, this model probably
is less prone to simultaneity bias than the previous short-run models
because ofthe linkage betweenthe London and world capital markets. If
however one accepts the conventional story in which high Bank rates
induced capital flows and reduced nominal income, simultaneous-
equations bias could be very severe.
The results from estimating equation (15') are reported in table 4.1.
They strongly support the model. The 0.61 "R2 is high for changes. All
signs are correct and, except for income, all are significant. The high
t-statistics for domestic yields may ofcourse be due partly to a short-run
influence from Bank rate to market rates. If the discount rate in France
responded to Bank rate and the French discount rate influenced French
market yields in the short run, then feedback also could run from Bank
rate to r. It seems unlikely however that a rise in Bank rate would cause
French market rates to rise by more than domestic rates, which is what is
required for a positive coefficient for r. If Bank rate influenced the
proportion and gold flow, then simultaneity presumably would work to
reduce the coefficients for those variables, in which case their influence
on Bank rate would be even stronger than indicated in table 4.1.
The results supportthe conventionalview thatthe Banksystematically
used Bank rate to defend convertibility. A low proportion, gold outflow,
or increased tightness in foreign financial markets caused the Bank to
raise Bank rate. What remains unclear is what short-run influence Bank
rate had on market rates, the proportion, gold flows, or income. Since
weekly dataexist for all ofthese variables butincome, an analysis oftheir
interdependencebasedon"causality" testswould be afruitful projectfor
further research.
4.4 Conclusions
Month-to-month changes in reserves and the proportion appear to be
dominated by seasonal factors and external gold flows. There is no
evidence that in the short run they responded to bankers' deposits,
domestic yields, or foreign-relative-to-domestic interest rates. The ab-
sence of any evidence for stock adjustment probably is due to several
factors, including simultaneity, important unobserved variables, and
changing short-run responses to portfolio disequilibrium. The evidence
for Bankratehoweveris consistentwith theconventionalwisdom. Botha
gold outflow and a high desired-relative-to-actual proportion tended to
result in a higher Bank rate.
Analysis of long-run operations of the Bank strongly support the
conventional wisdom about the gold standard. The Bank held fractional217 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
reserves against deposits, which implies that it played by the rules ofthe
game and bought securities as deposits and reserves increased. TheBank
also actively protected convertibility by increasing both reserves and the
proportion as French market rates rose relative to domestic yields. The
evidence also indicates that the proportion rose as nominal income
increased. In the long run Bank rate appeared to be dominated by
domestic market yields. The evidence however, indicates that Bank rate
rose as foreign rates increased relative to domestic yields.
Theconventionalwisdom tends to forget thatthe Bankwas private and
had to pay dividends. The results show that, like a normal commercial
bank, the Bank of England reduced reserves and the proportion as
interest rates increased. The tendency to reduce the proportion as in-
terest rates rose and raise it as nominal income increased meant that the
Bank followed conflicting policies over the business cycle. This behavior
and the inverse relation between securities and reserves implied by the
monetaryapproach helps explain why Bloomfield (1959) andothershave
concluded that the Bank did not play by the rules of the game.
Appendix Spectral Patterns
Figure4.A.1 showsspectralestimatesfor monthlygoldflows andchanges
in bankers' deposits. The variance in changes in bankers' deposits is
dominated by cycles of one year or less with a dominant peak at three
months and smaller peaks at four and six months.
The dominant elements for gold flows are a strong annual and three-
monthcycle. Unlike bankers' deposits, spectral estimates do not dropoff
sharplyfor cycles longer thanoneyear. Insteadestimatestendto dropoff
for cycles shorterthanthreemonths. Thespectrumfor differences in gold
flows-which is used in the regressions-does fall off rapidly for cycles
longer than one year.
Figure 4.A.2 shows spectral patterns for monthly changes in reserves
and total-earning assets. The spectrum for securities tends to decline as
cycle length increaseswith peaksat about2.3 and3.0monthsandanother
at the one-year cycle. Estimates for reserves decline somewhat beyond
one year, but reveal much stronger seasonal elements. There are signifi-
cant peaks at about 2.3, 3.0, 6.0, 9.0, and 12.0 months.
Figure 4.A.3 shows the spectrum for monthly changes in sixty-day
U.K.-Treasury-bill rates from 1897 to 1908 and, for comparison, the
spectrum for monthly changes in the ninety-day Treasury-bill rate from
1959 to 1970. The pre-World War I period is restricted to the period
1897-1908 so that both periods have approximately the same number of
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Fig.4.A.l Spectralestimatesfor monthlygoldflows andchangesin bank-
ers' deposits.
flat. Although estimates seem to rise up to about the one-year cycle and
then decline, the Treasury-bill rate behaved essentially like a random
walk. Spectral estimates for the gold standard era also increase as cycle
length increases, but then drop rapidly for cycles longer than one year.
Thepatternimplies structure in changes in short-run rates underthe gold
standard. In addition, spectral estimates are much higher at every fre-
quency for the gold standardera, indicating greatervariability in interest
rates in both the long and short run.
In order to combine the two series effectively, figure 4.A.4 shows the
spectral-density estimates for changes in the proportion and changes in
the log ofthe Bankrate. Once again the short run tends to dominate and
estimates dropoffrapidly beyond the one-yearcycle. Theproportion has
a very strong peak at three months and Bank rate has a definite peak at
one year. The decline in spectral estimates for the Bank rate for cycles
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IN MONTHS
Fig.4.A.2 Spectral estimates for monthly changes in total securities and
reserves.
in the rate generated by the Bank's concern for domestic trade and its
reluctance to make small changes (see, for example, Sayers [1936] 1970,
pp. 50-54).
The spectra for monthly changes in most of the series tend to be
dominated by high-frequency components. The spectral estimates also
show that, except for short-term interest rates, most series have strong
seasonal components.
Notes
1. No Durbin-Watson statistics are reported for these regressions.













LENGTH OF CYCLE IN MONTHS
Fig.4.A.3 Spectral estimates for changes in Treasury-bill rates, 1897-
1908 and 1959-70.
otherseries for the Bank. I therefore used datafrom the U.S. National Monetary Commis-
sion (1910) and information supplied by Goodhart to construct series for the Bank that
correspond to the same day ofthe month as his series on bankers' balances. Bank rate, but
not the proportion, is taken from Goodhart's book.
3. Theuse ofnonoverlappingannualaveragesofmonthlyobservationssmoothsthedata
and eliminates most ofthe short-run noise. When monthly data at twelve-month intervals
are used, the signal-to-noise ratio drops and most of the significance disappears.
4. Nonbankers' deposits also include the small item under liabilities called "seven day
and other bills."
5. If the Bank held more reserves for bankers' deposits than other liabilities, the
proportionwould be positively related to those deposits. In thatcase, Ycould be acting as a
proxy for BD. That, however, does not appear to be the case because, when bankers'
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Fig.4.A.4 Spectral-density estimates for monthly changes in bank rate
and proportion, 1893-1913.
6. For those who are interested in the behavior ofthe variables, their spectral patterns
are shown in the Appendix.
7. TheBank'sbalancesheetgives datafor thesecondweekofthemonthwhile goldflows
are reported for the calendar month. As a result changes in reserves from the second week
ofJune to the secondweekofJuly are regressed against thegoldflow in June minus the gold
flow in May. The same applies to regressions for the proportion and a similar situation also
exists for Bank rate.
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Comment Charles A. E. Goodhart
John Pippenger quotes Richard Sayers on the three main duties of the
governor of the Bank of England in the pre-1914 period: to maintain
convertibilityinto gold, a politicaldutyto look afterthefinancial needsof
government, and to maintain an income for the stockholders. Such
stockholdings ceased in 1946 when the Bank was nationalized, and the
fixed-exchange-rate system was abandoned in 1972. Butthe importance,
and at times the difficulties, of the Bank's relationships with the politi-
cians in Whitehall have increased over time. So it is something of a
pleasure for me to turn back again to examine the history of a period
when it could besaid that the operations and objectivesofthe Bankwere
largely independently decided within the context of the Bank Act of
1844.
My readingofthepapersby JohnPippengerandJohnDuttonleads me
to the view that there is a large measure ofcommon agreement among us
on the question of the actual way in which the Bank operated-its
positive actions. Theremay beless certainty, oragreement, onwhatwere
the reasons, the normative motives, that led to such behavior.
I would characterize the Bankduring this period as having a hierarchy
ofobjectives, a lexicographical utility function in our jargon. Although it
was only on rare occasions a matter ofconcern, the fundamental objec-
tive of the Bank was, I believe, the maintenance of the basic fabric and
structure of the banking and financial system. It is worth remembering
that the Bank Act was suspended at times ofextreme crises and that the
ultimate responsibility of the Bank was to the stability of the financial
system itself, not to the gold standard.
Undernormalcircumstances, however-and,with theexceptionofthe
Baringcrisis, the whole period up till the outbreakofwarin August 1914
could be described as normal-the most important function ofthe Bank
was to protecttheconvertibilityofits notesintogold, i.e., to maintain the
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gold standard. The instrument(s) which it predominantly used for this
purpose were short-term interest rates, administered changes in Bank
rate and market operations to make Bank rate effective, i.e., to keep
market rates in line with Bankrate. The gold devices were a ratherlesser
adjunct.
Most earlier writers have seen the Bank as adjusting its short-term
interest rates solely in response to variations in its liquidity position (i.e.,
the interest-rate instrumentwas assigned to the protectionofconvertibil-
ity). Duttonmentions Fordand Bloomfield as taking this view, andin my
own work (1972, p. 207) I also related changes in Bank rate only to the
Bank's liquidity position. Dutton has now challenged this view since he
finds that domestic cyclical variables, especially unemployment, had a
perhaps minor but nonetheless significant effect on the decision to make
Bank-rate changes. While I accept Dutton's carefully worked econo-
metric findings, it is nevertheless possible to interpret them in more than
one way. One interpretation is that there was a trade-off in objectives.
For a given loss of reserves, the Bank would raise Bank rate by more
(less) if domestic activity was higher (lower). But another possible inter-
pretation was that the state of activity in the country was treated by the
Bank as an indicator of the risk of future gold drains, either internal or
external, from its reserves. Subject to the above qualification, it is, I
hope, generally accepted that the Bank played the gold standard game
faithfully in respect of varying short-term interest rates in response to
changes in its liquidity position.
In my earlier work I noted that the elasticity of external gold flows in
response to relative interest-rate changes was sufficient to provide some
accommodation ofmonetarychanges to domesticactivity. Moreinterest-
ing, I felt, were my findings that bankers' balances at the Bank were not
related to the reserves orthe proportion in theBanking Department, but
were related to the level ofactivity. This finding suggested to me that the
Bank must have accommodated the demand for cash by buying more
securities at times when the reserves and proportion were low and in-
terest rates were high. These results are now supported by Dutton and
Pippenger. "Bank-reserve decreases seem to have led to increases in
Bankholdings ofinterest-earningassets. Insteadofamplifying the effects
of reserve changes on the money supply, the Bank seems to have steril-
ized them" (Dutton, p. 192). Pippenger also reports that the proportion
(ofgold reservesto liabilities in the BankingDepartment)fell when U.K.
interest rateswere higher. "TheBanksystematically reduced liquidity in
order to earn income" (Pippenger, p. 209). Having assigned to interest
rates the task ofprotecting convertibility, the Bank's market operations
provided a procyclical impulse to the monetary base in the United King-
dom. This conclusion about facts, reached from differing starting points
by the three of us, is, I believe, an important finding.224 John Pippenger
Why did the Bankbehave this way? Herethere are a range ofdiffering
interpretations. The first, espoused by Dutton, is that the setting of
interest rates by a central bank leaves it, during the period such rates are
fixed, passively responding to demands for accommodation at that rate.
Pippenger notes the inertia in Bank rate and the Bank's reluctance to
make small changes. Milton Friedman has regularly complained that the
preference of central banks for setting interest rates rather than the
monetary base imparts a procyclical bias to monetary changes. It is
interesting to find that this may have been the same in the United
Kingdom under the gold standard, as subsequently.
The second hypothesis, strongly advanced by Pippenger, is that the
Bankwas concerned to maintain its profits for its stockholders, thus "the
commercial duties ofthe Bankpromoted a procyclical monetary policy"
(Pippenger, p. 210). There is certainly evidence that the Bank was con-
cernedto maintain (thoughnottoseektomaximize) its profits duringthis
period, and I do not doubt that Pippenger's preferred explanation has
some weight (as also does Dutton's inertia hypothesis). My own reading
of the literature, however, makes me doubt whether profitability con-
cerns played quite such a major role as Pippenger suggests.
I would, however, tentatively offer a slightly different, but broadly
similar, reason for the Bank's behavior. In the earlier part of the
nineteenth century, the Bank had achieved a position of market domi-
nance as much (or more) because ofits size as from its strategic central
position as holder ofthe main gold reserves and lender-of-Iast-resort. As
the nineteenth century progressed, the relative size of the Bank fell
progressively compared with the joint-stock banks around it, and, with
the growth of the main London clearing banks, in part by a series of
mergers, theBankcame tofeel dwarfed andeventhreatenedin powerby
them. So, in addition to profits, the Bank may have retained some
concern with market share and size. As the size of the bill market
increased, other things being equal (i.e., with interest rates raised high
enough to maintain convertibility), the Bank, retaining a more than
purely residual banker's instinct, would have wanted to keep its share.
Ifa short digression may be permitted, it was quite largely this fear of
beingleftface-to-face in marketoperationswith the overmightysubjects,
in the form of the London Clearing Banks (LCB), that led the Bank
in the nineteenth century to encourage and sustain the discount houses,
to provide institutional buffers betweenitselfand the LCB. IfAmericans
try to imagine a world in which the Fed had to contend with, say, eight
colossal banks throughout the United States dominating the banking
system, they might also appreciate the need for buffers in such circum-
stances. Ithasbeenfascinatingtome, as amonetaryhistorian, tofind that
the provisions for revising monetary operations issued by the Bank in
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discount houses andthe bill markets, andfor exactlythesamereasons-a
disinclination to deal face-to-face with the huge clearing banks-as had
held in the nineteenth century. Plus ~a change, plus c'est la meme chose;
perhaps a comforting maxim for central bankers!
Therecould be, I suppose, a third hypothesis to accountfor the Bank's
behavior in this respect-that it was consciously following a procyclical
policy, e.g., in order to support "the needs of trade." Although there
was, as Dutton notes, some sensitivity in the Bank to the effects of its
policy on business conditions, my own assessment is that this hypothesis
is the least likely ofthe three to account for the procyclical variations in
the Bank's security holdings. But I have not the evidence, either from
contemporary accounts oreconometrictest (how could this besetup?) to
discriminate between these hypotheses.
Since I interpret Pippenger's results, as well as Dutton's, as closely in
accordance with my own, why then does Pippenger think he is challeng-
ing my findings? You must ask him. Perhaps he thought my claim that
"the Bank must have regularly accommodated, to some large extent,
variations in the demandfor cash" (1972, p. 206), impliedthattheBank's
motivewas consciously to do so. Ifso, heread too much into thosewords,
for it remains entirely consistent with my position for such accommoda-
tion to have been the unconscious result of other sources of action,
including Pippenger's profit motive.
Nonetheless there are some differences in approach between us. Sub-
ject to the gold devices, the maintenance of convertibility required the
Bank to buy or sell gold at fixed, known prices. So in the short run,
changes in the Bank's reserves were determined by others, not by the
Bank. It was not, within this time frame, a choice variable that the Bank
could determine. The Bank's choice variables were Bank rate and its
marketoperations. Thus I would follow Duttonin settingup equationsin
which Bank rate or securities holdings are functions, inter alia, of the
level of reserves or the proportion. It may be that this concentrates
attention on the shorter run: indeed, my reason for including a time
variable in my own equations was to try to eliminate the influence of
long-run common trends.
I hope Pippenger would accept the above. I think he criticizes me for
ignoring the possible effect oflonger-term changes in the Bank'sdemand
for reserves. But since any individual short-run observation will tend to
be off the Bank's underlying demand function, he has to transform his
data into annual averages ofmonthly data to try and capture his longer-
term relationships, so both the time period and data base of our studies
were rather diferent. In any case, I find no difficulty in accepting his
findings ofthe relationships between U.K. and French interest rates and
the Bank's reserves and proportion, though I would interpret the direc-
tion of causality somewhat differently. A problem with his longer-term226 John Pippenger
approach (see the equation on p. 208) is that both the dependent and
(some of)theindependentvariableswill have beengrowing overtime, so
that deflation by a scale variable (perhaps preferable to my use ofa time
dummy) would help to remove common trends. Even in the case of his
equation for the proportion (see p. 209), there was a rise between 1893
and1913 (from45.7 to48.5), so thatwhentime is enteredas an additional
variable, the significant positive coefficient on Y (which appears to con-
trast so sharply with my own result), disappears.!
WhatPippenger'sreformulatedequationshave done, for me atleast, is
to raise the question of the determinants of deposits in the Banking
Department that were not bankers' balances, NBD in his terminology,
and also whether the Bank responded differently to changes in BD and
NBD. For example, in the second part of his paper where he sought to
examine short-run relationships, Pippenger found a significant positive
relationship between monthly changes in the Bank's reserves and in
NBD. One possible explanation may be that most of the main gold
dealers in London had accounts at the Bank (though there could be some
question in oneortwo caseswhetherthe accounts would beclassified as a
banker'sbalanceornot), so payments for gold purchases (sales) might in
the first instance be met by crediting (debiting) an NBD account?
In private correspondence with me, John Pippenger also raised the
possibility that the Bank may have felt a stronger obligation to hold
reserves against NBD than against BD, perhaps on the grounds that the
Bank could rely on the banks' need to hold some minimum level of
operational balances. Although the Bank did have an estimate of the
latter,3 I doubt that it is a likely possibility. First, it would suggest that the
level ofreserves was more undertheshort-term controlofthe Bankthan,
I believe, is justified. Second, it hardly squares with the relative sizes of
the coefficients for BD and NBD in Pippenger's earlier equations (p.
208). Be that as it may, Pippenger's work suggests that the behavior of
nonbankers' deposits (NBD) may also be worth studying. Whether we
will also obtain more enlightenment from his spectral patterns, I find
more difficult to tell; I did not get much from them.
BothPippenger'sandDutton'spapersappliedeconometricmethodsto
examine the historical behavior of the Bank. Amidst the differences of
econometric techniques and some academic disputations, I have-
perhaps hopefully-perceived an emerging consensus ofviews about the
positive facts of-ifnot the normative motives for-such behavior. That
is an advance.
Notes
1. My thanks are due to John Pippenger for running these extra regressions for me.227 Bank of England Operations, 1893-1913
2. lowethis informationtoA. F. A. Carlisle who found a recordofthese accounts in the
Bank's archives.
3. See Goodhart 1972, pp. 109-17 and Presnell 1968, pp. 167-228.
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General Discussion of
Dutton and Pippenger Papers
MUNDELL made several points drawn from the session as a whole. He
noted that it was -an historical occasion to hear a discussion by so many
economists of an issue that had been close to his heart for some time.
Fromhis casual knowledge ofeconomic history he believed that the gold
standard has never received so much attention by so many economists in
such a concentratedperiodoftime. This testifies to the importanceofthe
subject to the economics profession.
He was struck by two key issues. One was the way in which the
international adjustment process worked under the gold standard; the
other was the overall global approach to the nineteenth century gold
standard. He thought that the transfer problem was swept under the rug
atfirst, butit quicklywon attentionwhenempiricalissueswerediscussed.
It is important to realize that the transfer problem itself is crucial for an
understanding ofthe gold standard. Thus periods in which international
transfers were being made should be used to illustrate the economic
events of those years.
Mundell stressed that the transfer problem exists even outside the
context ofcapital movements, reparations payments, or other unilateral
transfers. It exists by the very idea that money is transferred from one
group to another, which is a shift ofpurchasing power from one country
to another, anda goldflow accompaniestheshifteitheras causeoreffect.
There is an accompanying transfer ofreal resources because the country
that receives gold has to have income in excess of its expenditures, and
the deficit country-the gold exporting country-to effect the transfer
has to have expenditure in excess of its income. That is the heart of the
earliermechanismofGervaiseupthroughtheabsorptionapproachtothe
transfer problems in the balance of payments in the 1950s.228 John Pippenger
In the literature over the past fifty years there is a great controversy as
to whether, in orderto effect a transfer, relative prices must change, and
whether that change comes about in the terms of trade or in the ratio of
international-to-domestic prices. Even Viner at some point understood
that there are cases in which relative changes are not crucial to the
movement oftransfers. Take as an example a small country in the world
economy that has to lend or pay money to another small country. With
perfect capital and goods mobility, there is no need for any changes in
prices. There is simply a shift of expenditures, without any further
effects. This shift is a crucial partofthemechanism quite apartfrom pure
capitalflows. Liquidityflows, then, are thestartingpoint; secondly, there
is the transfer problem; and thirdly, the issue oflong-term lending flows
or transfers that was involved in the discussion with BrinleyThomas and
Moe Abramovitz. Inthat contextofthe long swings ofeconomic activity,
Britain lends to America, the lendingis a result ofan expansionary boom
in the United States like the railway boom, capital flows to the United
States, but the money or the trade transfer is not as large as the capital-
movement transfer. The explanation comes in the correct solution ofthe
transfer problem, which was discussed most exactly and very precisely in
the literature of the 1930s-not in the literature of the Keynes-Ohlin
controversybutratherin theliteraturefollowing the review by Sir Dennis
Robertson ofViner's Studies in the Theory ofInternational Trade (1937).
According to Viner, in the discussion of where the gold goes, the key
issue is whathappensto the demandfor money. Ifthe demandfor money
increases in the gold-receiving country, then the gold has to go to the
receiving country. The crucial distinction is whether the demand for
money is a function of domestic expenditure or a function of national
income. Robertson took the position that the demand for money is a
function ofnational income while Viner took the opposing position that
the demand for money is a function of domestic expenditure, which he
cans "final purchases" andwhich Keynes and Meade lateron call domes-
tic expenditure.
FRATIANNI pointedoutthatboththe Humeanprice-specieflow andthe
monetary approach to the balance ofpayments suggest thatfollowing an
expansion ofthe domestic componentofthemonetarybase, therewill be
an outflow of gold. In this view, causation runs from domestic credit
expansion to gold flows. The reaction-function framework used by Dut-
ton and Pippenger suggests the opposite; according to that framework,
the monetary authorities adjust through purchases and sales on the open
market to changes in gold flows. The data clearly cannot discriminate
between the two views. Thus, the crucial unanswered question is how to
go about differentiating between these mechanisms.
Fratianni also raised the question of whether, in Dutton's paper,
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sense that changes in the independent variables occur before changes in
domestic credit expansion. This question is crucial for differentiating
between the two possible interpretations of the results.
MCGOULDRICK also expressed the opinionthatthe correlation between
Bank rate and gold flows results from the influence of the first variable
over the second.
DUTTON responded that econometrically the right-hand-side variables
are completely predetermined. Whatever the Bank of England chooses
to do at that point is a result rather than a cause.
MUNDELL statedthatwhetherapositivecorrelationbetweengoldflows
and changes in the Bank's domestic assets was evidence of passive be-
havior of the Bank or evidence of deliberate policy was important and
similar to the debate for the 1945-71 period.
PIPPENGER responded to Goodhart by arguing that the idea that the
BankofEnglandcontrolledinterest rates in Londonoverany substantial
period of time is almost inconceivable. Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, London was the center of an international capital market of vast
proportions; the Bank of England was only one relatively small bank in
London, a city that was only one part of a large international capital
market. Changes in Bank rate merely reflect the fact that the Bank of
England sometimes found itself in portfolio disequilibrium. One of the
ways the Bank restored portfolio equilibrium in periods when its actual
proportion fell below desired levels was to raise Bank rate relative to
discount rates in orderto discourage discounting at the BankofEngland.
This maneuver would reduce the Bank's holdings of assets and raise its
proportion. The idea that the Bank of England could use Bank rate to
control interest rates in Great Britain would imply that over the longer
run, if its choice of Bank rate was inappropriate, then its proportion
would explode to plus or minus infinity.
GOODHART responded thattherewas not thatmuch difference between
Pippenger's and his own views. Pippenger concentrates on the long run,
whereas Goodhartin his earlierwork had concentratedonthe short run.
In Goodhart's view, Pippenger's analysis of the long run is correct.
Under a fixed-exchange-rate system, there is no way that in the long run
the United Kingdom could have maintainedinterest rates outofline with
those in the rest of the world without the Bank of England's proportion
moving up or down endlessly. In the short run, on the other hand, the
Bank of England actually did exert some control over interest rates.
PIPPENGER disagreedwith Goodhartevenfor the shortrun. In his view,
the Bank of England could no more control market interest rates in
London in the 1800s than the Federal Reserve Boardcan control interest
rates in New York today. Butthis statement is different from saying that
the Bank of England cannot influence interest rates--eontrol and in-
fluence are different matters. Pippenger agreed that the BankofEngland230 John Pippenger
was capable of influencing interest rates. However, if the Bank of En-
gland had attempted to set an inappropriately low rate, it would have
been inundated with borrowing and would have found its proportion
going to zero. If it had set Bank rate at 20 percent, it would have found
that no one borrowed from it, and furthermore that it was earning no
income andmight go bankrupt. Therefore, itcould not act independently
of market rates, even in the short run.
GOODHART responded by pointing out that the Bank of England actu-
ally operated in markets to try and make Bank rate effective. On many
occasions in the nineteenth century, there are indications of concern
within the Bank of England that it was not able to make Bank rate
effective, at least until the Bankdeveloped mechanisms by which it could
affect the amountofcash available in the market. Ofcourse, the range of
freedom of any central bank-if not the Fed then certainly the central
bank of a relatively small open economy-is severely limited. The Bank
ofEngland cannot go out tomorrow and set rates at 30 percent any more
than it can go out and set them at 2 percent. But ifBank rate today is 13,
then the BankofEnglandcan surely change it up to 15 orchange it down
to 11. It could do that in the nineteenth century as well.
FREEDMAN returned to the distinction between the long run and the
short run. He pointed out that Goodhart and Pippenger seemed to nave
agreed that in the long run the Bank of England was incapable of
maintaining a Bank rate out-of-line with interest rates elsewhere. But
that conclusion depends on assumptions about the response of other
central banks. If the Bank of England lowered Bank rate and was
inundatedwith discounts, it is importantto know howtheBankofFrance
and othercentral banks responded to the BankofEngland's initiative. If
they adjusted their discount rates in the same direction, then it was at
least conceivable that the Bank of England could impose its rate on the
rest of the world.
DORNBUSCH pointed out that the Bank of England never actually
discounted at Bank rate. Itposted Bankrate but intervened at rates very
close to market rates. The actual rates atwhich transactions tookplacein
any given week took the form of a distribution centered around the
market rate. Although Bank rate was infrequently moved, the effective
rate of interest charged by the Bank moved week-to-week.
MUNDELL suggested that it maybe useful to divide the nineteenth
century into two parts when addressing the question ofspeeds of adjust-
ment. Conditions certainly changed with the invention ofthe telegraph.
The ability ofthe telegraph to increase the speed with which information
was diffused permitted a global market to become established.
Mundell commented also on another difference between the pre-1870
and post-1870 periods, namely, the introduction of flexible silver prices
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really two worlds: one of silver standard countries and another of gold
standard countries. That made a very large difference in the interpreta-
tion of the two periods.
EICHENGREEN addressed the seemingly paradoxical results concerning
changes over time in the sensitivity of the Bank of England to internal
economic conditions. According to Dutton'spaper, theBankofEngland
became less sensitive to changes in internal conditions after 1890, which
seems counterintuitive. Eichengreen reported some results by Richard
Grossman of Harvard University, who attempted to estimate a similar
function for the period 1925-31, finding that the Bank of England again
became less sensitive to changes in internal conditions after the First
World War. This result is clearly inconsistent with the vast majority of
historical studies thatindicate the Bankoften hesitatedto raise Bankrate
in the interwar period for fear thatits action might injure British industry
or arouse Treasury officials. It is certainly conceivable that the vast
majority ofhistorical studies are simply wrong, but it is also possible that
the reaction-function methodology, the specification, or the empirical
techniques adoptedby the authorsis inappropriate. Onewayin which the
specification may be deficient is that it fails to recognize the existence of
nonlinearities in the relationship of Bank rate to internal economic
conditions. Such nonlinearities were recognized at the time by the Bank
of England: for example, Bank officials apparently believed that Bank
rate had to exceed a certain crucial threshold-usually taken to be 4.5
percent-beforeit began to affect short-term interest rates, and thatonly
when Bank rate remained above that threshold for extended periods
were long-term market rates ofinterest affected. Although commercial-
bankoverdrafts were extended at rates 0.5 to 1percent above Bankrate,
and although exceptions were sometimes made for favored customers,
these rates were normally subject to a floor ofabout 5 percent. Thus, so
long as Bank rate remained at or below 4.5 percent, it could be argued
that domestic-credit conditions were unaffected by measures designed to
attract gold and short-term capital inflows. Such nonlinearities could be
readily incorporated into the reaction-function framework, but the au-
thors' failure to model such institutional detail may bias their results
toward insignificance.
MCCLOSKEY argued that the Bank of England's actions only matter if
one believes in the price-specie-flow mechanism. That theoretical con-
struct is the intellectual origin ofthe question ofwhethertheBankplayed
by the rules of the gold standard game. If one does not believe in the
price-specie-flow mechanism, then the question of whether the Bank
played by the rules of the game or sterilized gold flows and whether it
raisedorloweredBankratein response to changesin itsfinancial position
is irrelevant to the question ofwhat determined the level ofinterest rates
in England and the rest of the world.232 John Pippenger
GOODHART responded to other discussants by pointing out that Bank
rate, at least from 1900 onwards, was varied with frequency. While the
Bank of England was concerned to make Bank rate effective, it is also
true that movements in Bank rate were regarded as signals and that most
ofthe Bank's business, as Dornbusch noted, was done at rates related to
existingmarketrates. However, whentheBankwished tosignal achange
ofgear, to use Richard Sayers's phrase, it would raise orlower Bankrate
and then try to enforce the change in market rates by operating to do so.
PIPPENGER concludedbysummarizinghis view thattheway theBankof
England behaved in the long run is straightforward and fits the conven-
tional view with only minormodifications. Whatis interesting, therefore,
is how the gold standard worked and the Bank's role in its operation,
particularly in the short run.
DUTION concluded with a dissent from the view that the Bank of
England's operations had no impact. Even if the Bank had no control
over the moneysupply, Dutton argued, it still retained an influence over
theproportionofthemoneysuplythatwas backedby gold. In anycase, it
had some control over its gold stocks and had a desire to defend their
level.
Fromreading descriptions oftheperiod, Duttonsuggested, it certainly
appears thatin the shortrun atleast, theBankofEngland believed Bank
rate could be used to change London money-market rates relative to
rates in the rest ofworld, and, by so doing, that it could induce capital to
flow among financial centers. Bank rate did have some effect, despite
being simultaneously determined with other interest rates. It could be
and was used as a policy tool.